The international scope of transnational arbitration agreements and their effect on United States corporations by Linken, Allen
Revista Contraponto | vol. 1 n. 1 | jan./jul. 2014 
The international scope of transnational arbitration agreements and their effect 
on United States corporations 
 
Allen Linken1 
 
Abstract 
 
This note focuses on the history of arbitration to provide a general background of 
arbitration, in Part II, and a discussion of federal and international arbitration acts, in 
Part III.  Subsequent to that, in Part IV, there is a discussion on the backbone of the 
United States’ transnational arbitration policy adopted by the United States Supreme 
Court by looking at decisional law and analyzing the language used.  Subsequent to 
that, the realities of transnational business will be examined in Part IV, followed by 
the recognition of judgments against American domiciliaries, in Part VI.  Finally, this 
note will examine the pitfalls that this policy creates in Part VII, and alternative, more 
isolationist, policies will be examined to the existing policy will be examined in Part 
VIII. 
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Introduction 
 
 The world as it is today is not as it was centuries, or even decades ago.  
Business transactions have progressed beyond members of villages interacting with 
each other.  In modern society, billions upon billions of dollars of trade are transacted 
each and every day.2 Inevitably, there will be disputes that occur in the normal course 
of business. As there is no uniform international law, these disputes could cripple 
business on a global scale, as no respectable business would contract with a party 
from a foreign country out of fear of breach.3  Arbitration alleviates that fear.4  The 
two opposing parties can contract for virtually every term that they can imagine, and 
these imagined terms can include a remedy for breach, so the party who was 
breached against does not suffer irreparable economic harm.5   
 The United States Supreme Court adopted, and has continually supported, 
transborder arbitration – arbitration between two parties of differing domiciles – and 
the Court has preferred to let the contracts, the instruments that authorize and control 
the arbitration, stand as written.6 That is, the Court has not carefully scrutinized 
contract terms, preferring instead a system that favors international progress, even at 
the expense of the American domiciliary.7 
 This note focuses on the history of arbitration to provide a general background 
of arbitration, in Part II, and a discussion of federal and international arbitration acts, 
in Part III.  Subsequent to that, in Part IV, there is a discussion on the backbone of 
the United States’ transnational arbitration policy adopted by the United States 
Supreme Court by looking at decisional law and analyzing the language used.  
Subsequent to that, the realities of transnational business will be examined in Part IV, 
followed by the recognition of judgments against American domiciliaries, in Part VI.  
Finally, this note will examine the pitfalls that this policy creates in Part VII, and 
                                                 
2 See World Trade Organization, 2003 International Trade Statistics 23 (2003). 
3 Carbonneau, Thomas, Cases and Materials on The Law and Practice of Arbitration 2 (3d ed. 2003). 
4 Id. 
5 Drafting an Arbitration Agreement, available at http://www.law-online.co.za/arbitration/arbdraft.html 
(last visited October 7, 2004). 
6 See, e.g. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); see also, e.g. Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); see also, e.g. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrystler-Plymouth, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
7 See, e.g. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); see also, e.g. Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), see also, e.g. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrystler-Plymouth, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
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alternative, more isolationist, policies will be examined to the existing policy will be 
examined in Part VIII. 
 
History and background of international arbitration 
 
 Arbitration, in one form or another has been around for centuries.8  This age-
old institution is a “method of dispute resolution involving one or more neutral third 
parties who are usu. agreed to by the disputing parties and whose decision is 
binding.”9  This method dates back to trade associations and merchant guilds in 
European countries.10  The reasons for this preference by merchants and tradesmen 
are in many ways the same ones as those motivating multinational corporations 
today.  The tradespeople believed that arbitration expedited the process of dispute 
resolution, and that the courts were not sophisticated enough to fully comprehend the 
nature of the agreement and the intricacies of the transaction.11  Moreover, an 
agreement to arbitrate would open a whole new world of potential remedies to the 
parties, as they could contract for any possible remedy that they may dream up, 
where a court of law is bound by well established legal principles and remedies.12 
Arbitration, however, is certainly not limited to commercial transactions across 
borders. There are instances of arbitration in many fields and areas of law, including 
environmental13 and intellectual property,14 to name just two.  These arbitrations form 
a backbone for international commercial arbitration – that is, the precedent for 
deciding cases and conflicts across boundaries and borders.  Moreover, these 
arbitrations form a background for understanding how parties from two nations can 
work together to enable a case to be decided definitively. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 See Katherine Van Wetzel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 931, 960 (1999). 
9 Black’s Law Dictionary 41 (7th ed. 1999). 
10 Todd Baker, Comment, Arbitration:  Arbitration in the 21st Century: Where We’ve Been, Where 
We’re Going, 53 Okla. L. Rev. 653, 654 (2000). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 See infra note 14. 
14 See infra note 27. 
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A. Trail Smelter Arbitration15 
 
 Trail Smelter was the first arbitral proceeding of its kind.16  This arbitration 
involved the operation of a smelter located in British Columbia, Canada.17  Sulfur 
dioxide emissions from the smelter were causing substantial damage to several 
farms in the state of Washington, United States.18  In 1935, the governments of the 
United States and Canada signed a convention under which a tribunal was 
established in order to resolve questions concerning the nature and extent of the 
damage caused by the Canadian smelting plant.19  This tribunal was also charged 
with providing remedies including indemnity and injunction, and with prescribing 
measures or regimes to be “adopted or maintained by the Trail Smelter.”20  The 
compromise set forth that the arbitrators were to apply the “law and practice 
followed…in the United States of America as well as international law and practice.”21 
 The United States claimed indemnity for injury that was primarily economic in 
nature.22  These claims included indemnity for cleared land and improvements on it, 
uncleared land and improvements on it, livestock, property in the town of Northport, 
and business enterprises.23  It would be the job of the arbitrators to sort out those 
claims and award damages for meritorious claims under the auspices and guidelines 
of international law. 
 The arbitrators found that no State has the right to use or permit the use of its 
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another 
or the properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and 
the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.24  The tribunal held that 
the Dominion of Canada was responsible in international law for the conduct of Trail 
Smelter.25  Finally, the tribunal implemented their decision by imposing a focused and 
                                                 
15 Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938 and 1941). 
16 It remains the only recorded air pollution dispute being resolved in accordance with international 
law.  Phoebe Okowa, State Responsibility for Transborder Air Pollution in International Law, 50 Int’l & 
Comp. L.Q. 472 (April 1991). 
17 Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1905. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Convention for Settlement of Difficulties Arising from Operations of Smelter at Trail, B.C., Apr. 15, 
1935; Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. at 1907-08 (1938 and 1941). 
22 See Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1907-08. 
23 Id. at 1920. 
24 See Id. at 1905. 
25 Id. at 1974-77. 
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organized regime of controls on the emission of sulfur dioxide fumes from the 
smelter.26  Of importance from this arbitration is that the adverse countries consented 
to arbitral rule under the rule and custom of international law.27  This consent of 
authority was precedent setting as it demonstrated that two countries could 
cooperate in the international community when there were real stakes in interest. 
 
B. A WIPO Trademark Arbitration28 
 
 Arbitral proceedings are not limited to environmental issues.  WIPO, the World 
Intellectual Property Organization, also conducts arbitral proceedings.29  One such 
proceeding involved a North-American software developer.30  This developer 
registered a trademark for communication software in the United States and 
Canada.31  A manufacturer of computer hardware based elsewhere registered an 
almost identical mark for computer hardware in a number of Asian countries.32  Both 
companies had been engaged in legal proceedings in various jurisdictions 
concerning the registration and use of their marks.33  Each company had effectively 
prevented the other from registering or using its mark in the jurisdictions in which it 
holds prior rights.34  In order to facilitate the use and registration of their respective 
marks worldwide, the parties entered into a coexistence agreement, which contains a 
WIPO arbitration clause.35  When the North-American company tried to register its 
trademark in China, the application was refused because of a risk of confusion with 
                                                 
26 Id.  
27 See Id.  at 1907-08. 
28 Due to the World Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO) rules on confidentiality, the facts of this 
case, inclusive even of party name, are removed from its summary.  This is pursuant to Chapter VII, 
Article 73 of the WIPO Rules of Arbitration, which provide in pertinent part:  “(a) Except to the extent 
necessary in connection with a court challenge to the arbitration or an action for enforcement of an 
award, no information concerning the existence of an arbitration may be unilaterally disclosed by a 
party to any third party unless it is required to do so by law or by a competent regulatory body, and 
then only:  (i) by disclosing no more than what is legally required; and (ii) by furnishing to the Tribunal 
and to the other party, if the disclosure takes place during the arbitration, or to the other party alone, if 
the disclosure takes place after the termination of the arbitration, details of the disclosure and an 
explanation of the reason for it. 
29 See WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/center/index.html. 
30 See WIPO Arbitration Case Examples, A WIPO Trademark Arbitration, at 
http://arbiter.wipo.int/arbitration/case-example.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2004). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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the prior mark held by the other party.36  The North-American company requested 
that the other party undertake any efforts necessary to enable it to register its mark in 
an Asian country and, when the other party refused, initiated arbitration 
proceedings.37 
 This is a significant example of international arbitration, as it shows that 
arbitration extends further than the environment and into international business, in 
this case, intellectual property.  This arbitration reflects the growing need of arbitral 
institutions in a world that is becoming more globalized.38  
 
Federal and international arbitration acts 
 
A. The United States Arbitration Act of 1925:  History and Interpretation 
 
 The United States Arbitration Act of 192539 (hereinafter FAA40) signified a 
stark legislative change from the period preceding the act.41  This period before 
enactment of the FAA was characterized by a near impossibility for two reasonably 
intelligent business entities to enter into a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate any 
issues arising out of their business dealings.42  In the United States, there is evidence 
that commercial arbitration existed before the Revolutionary War.43  These American 
cases took their lead from English cases of the same period.44  The policy of anti-
                                                 
36 WIPO Arbitration Case Examples, A WIPO Trademark Arbitration, at 
http://arbiter.wipo.int/arbitration/case-example.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2004). 
37 Id. 
38 See infra Part V. 
39 9 U.S.C. § 1-14. 
40 Abbreviated from “Federal Arbitration Act,” an alternative name of the United States Arbitration Act 
of 1925. 
41 Sarah E. Larson, Comment, Current Public Law and Policy Issue:  An Examination of the Broad 
Scope of the Federal Arbitration Act and Binding Mandatory Consumer Arbitration Agreements:  Not 
the Answer to Racial Bias in the United States Legal System, 24 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 293, 305 
(2003). 
42 Id. 
43 See Stephen B. Goldberg et al., Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation, and Other Processes 
199 (1992). 
44 Lord Coke's opinion in Vynior's Case, decided in 1609, formed the basis for the common law 
doctrine where either party involved in an arbitration may withdraw at any time before an actual award 
was rendered, and that an agreement to arbitrate a future dispute was against public policy, and 
therefore not enforceable.  Vynior's Case (Trinity Term, 7 Jac. 1) 77 Eng. Rep. 595 (K.B. 1609); 
http://www.voluntaryist.com/articles/084.php (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).  In Vynior's Case, the King's 
Bench made compulsory a bond to ensure compliance with the agreement.  Tradesmen, therefore, 
who regularly used these bonds to ensure the performance of agreements effectively made use of this 
remedy.  In 1697, however, Parliament passed into law the Statute of Fines and Penalties, which 
forbade the use of penalty bonds as a remedy for breach of contract.  See Statute of Fines and 
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arbitration spread throughout the colonies, and ultimately the judiciaries of the 
colonies, which remained in place as the colonies became states.45  Courts in the 
United States, from the 17th to the early 20th century, were very reluctant to enforce 
arbitration agreements, and frequently nulled clauses invoking arbitration, basing 
their decisions on Vynior’s Case and the line of cases that stemmed from it.46 Those 
judges, including Justice Story,47 believed that provisions to arbitrate extended the 
jurisdiction of the court beyond where it was intended to stretch.48 
 This anti-arbitration sentiment continued after the New York State Arbitration 
Statute, the first modern arbitration statute, was passed in 1920.49  The FAA, 50 in 
fact, was based on the New York State Arbitration Statute,51 and supporters of the 
statute52 held that this legislation drew its power from Article III of the United States 
Constitution, and more specifically from the power to establish procedures for the 
federal courts.53 
 The FAA serves several important functions in the recognition and valuation of 
arbitration.  It serves to nullify lawsuits that are brought in courts, and force the 
parties to proceed to arbitration, when there is a valid agreement to arbitrate.54  
Moreover, the FAA legitimated arbitration as an adjudicatory mechanism and gave 
the entire arbitration process valuable systemic autonomy that was required for it to 
                                                                                                                                                        
Penalties, 8 & 9 Will. 3, ch. 11 § 8 (1697) (Eng); 12 Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law 
519-20 (2d prtg. 1966).  The application of the statute resulted in English courts only awarding nominal 
damages for breach of arbitration agreements.  Vynior's Case (Trinity Term, 7 Jac. 1) 77 Eng. Rep. 
595 (K.B. 1609). 
45 http://www.voluntaryist.com/articles/084.php (last visited Apr. 6, 2004). 
46 Baker, supra note 9, at 655. 
47 Justice Story in 1845 wrote “...when [courts] are asked to…compel the parties to appoint arbitrators 
whose award shall be final, they necessarily pause to consider, whether such tribunals possess 
adequate means of giving redress, and whether they have a right to compel a reluctant party to submit 
to such a tribunal, and to close against him the doors of the common courts of justice, provided by the 
government to protect rights and to redress wrongs.”  Carbonneau, supra note 2, at 49 (citing Tobey v. 
County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1920-21). 
48 See Stephen K. Huber & E. Wendy Trachte-Huber, Arbitration: Cases and Materials 9 (1998). 
49 Donald J. Kennedy, Maritime Arbitration 1899-1999, at http://www.clm.com/pubs/pub-
880938_1.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2004). 
50 9 USC §2.  The FAA was modified in 1970, 1988, and 1990 with supplementary provisions, but for 
the most part, the modern Federal Arbitration Act is almost unchanged from its original form.   
51 See Huber, supra note 47, at 5. 
52 The American Bar Association, working through one of its committees, created a draft statute that 
was approved by the ABA in 1922 with no dissent.  Congress adopted this statute, with minimal 
change in 1925.  Jean Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:  Debunking the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration. 74 Wash. U.L.Q. 637, 645. 
53 See Van Wetzel Stone, supra note 7, at 944. 
54 Carbonneau, supra note 2, at 50. 
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function effectively as an alternative to litigation, and generally as a remedial 
process.55 
 The FAA provided that agreements to arbitrate are "valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract."56  Hashing out the purpose and policy of the FAA is important to an 
understanding of the Supreme Court’s strong endorsement of the propriety of 
transborder commercial arbitrability.  The FAA was originally seen as applicable to 
consensual transactions between two merchants of roughly equal bargaining power, 
and not necessarily transactions between parties with grossly unequal bargaining 
power, such as a large firm negotiating with a less knowledgeable consumer with 
comparably fewer resources.57   
 When the FAA was enacted, the economy of the world was different; there 
were fewer commercial transactions between multinational companies and simple 
consumers, and therefore fewer transactions would have fallen under the original 
scope of the FAA.58  Senator Walsh, of Montana,59 feared that arbitration contracts 
would be “offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive customers or employees,” 
but his fears were allayed by supporters of the bill, who said that the FAA would not 
encompass such situations.60  The FAA was signed into law in the “Roaring 20’s” 
where business was booming and commercial transactions were frequent, and 
substantial.61  This period of economic prosperity was followed by the hardest 
economic period in American history, in the form of the Great Depression.62  Coupled 
with rising German business interests,63 the increasing scale of business would 
                                                 
55 Id. 
56 Baker, supra note 9, at 656. 
57 Zhaodong Jiang, Federal Arbitration Law and State Court Proceedings, 23 Loyola L.A. L. Rev 473, 
478 n.20 (1990). 
58 Sternlight, supra note 51, at 647 n44.  In 1925, under 28 USC §1332,  the amount in controversy 
requirement to bring a case in federal district court was $3,000.  21 Hofstra L. Rev. 385, 459 (1992). 
59 Senator Thomas James Walsh represented the State of Montana in the United States Senate from 
1913 to 1932.  Biographical Directory of the United States Congress: 1774 – Present, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch1.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2004). 
60 74 Wash. U.L.Q. 637, 647 (citing Prima Paint v. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co, 388 U.S. 395, 414 
(Black, J., dissenting) (citing Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 before the Subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 9-11 (1923)). 
61 Sternlight, supra note 51, at 647. 
62 Id. 
63 The German unemployment rate fell from six million people in 1933 to 2.5 million people in 1936, to 
three-hundred thousand people in 1939.  
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/nazis_and_the_german_economy.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004). 
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create lopsided bargaining power to coerce individual consumers into signing one-
sided arbitration agreements.64 
 As time progressed, the Supreme Court broadened the scope of application of 
the FAA.  With state cases such as Wilko v. Swan,65 the Supreme Court held that 
arbitration must be mutually consented to and must serve the public interest.66  The 
court held this agreement permissible “if the parties [were] willing to accept less 
certainty of legally correct adjustment.”67  The court, clearly limiting the scope of 
domestic arbitration, prohibited arbitration of a customer’s securities fraud action 
against a brokerage house, their decision being based in some part on the fact that 
sellers possess more business acumen and relevant information that buyers 
possess.68   
 In the late 1950’s into the 1960’s, the Supreme Court examined social policies 
as a rationalization to broaden the scope of the FAA.69  It was in this period of 
broadening the scope of the FAA that the modern day arguments for arbitration in 
lieu of litigation arose.  The rationale stated above, that was used by the tradesmen, 
has evolved and changed into 21st century reasons to arbitrate claims70  Arbitration is 
generally speaking, faster and more cost-effective than a judicial adjudication.71  
Moreover, the parties may choose the arbitrator,72 the confidentiality of the 
                                                 
64 Sternlight, supra note 51, at 647. 
65 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
66 Sternlight, supra note 51, at 648. 
67 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438 (1953). 
68 Sternlight, supra note 51, at 648. 
69 Id. at 655. 
70 There are multiple reasons why a party in the 21st century desires to arbitrate claims instead of 
going through the judicial system of the country with jurisdiction.   
71 Joseph T. McLaughlin, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Under the New York Convention:  Practice in 
U.S. Courts, 477 PLI/Comm 275, 275.  Small and medium sized businesses in commerce can easily 
go bankrupt over one multi-million dollar contract.  Carbonneau, supra note 2, at 2.  With the explicit 
costs of litigation, including depositions, lawyers fees, and the implicit costs of litigation, including the 
opportunity cost of not being able to do other things with the money that is tied up in litigation, a single 
contract that gets litigated over may cause one of these smaller firms to suffer great loss.  See 
generally N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Microeconomics (3d ed, 2004) (discussing the economic 
concept of opportunity cost).  With arbitration, the parties involved spend little time waiting to get 
before an arbitral tribunal to have their case heard, which leads to less time spent on the matter, 
accordingly saving money.  The arbitration decision and award are final, and as a result, the only 
money expended after an award is rendered will be on collection of that award, and not appeal of the 
award.  McLaughlin, supra note 70.  With the “judicialization” of arbitration in the past ten to fifteen 
years, arbitration can endure as long as judicial adjudication, but the key benefit that remains is that 
the cost of arbitration will be significantly lower than the cost of litigation as there is no appeal, which 
would require more money to be spent on the matter.  Ask the ADR Professionals, National Arbitration 
Forum, available at http://www.arb-forum.com/articles/html/ADRPro-jud-07-02.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 
2004). 
72 See Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, Articles 7-12 [hereinafter ICC 
Rules]; see also The London Court of International Arbitration Rules, Article 17 [hereinafter LCIA 
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proceeding is maintained,73 and arbitration eliminates, in whole, or in part, legal 
uncertainty from the process by contracting for specific provisions.74  Another 
important benefit of arbitration is that it allows neutrality, whereas litigation in state or 
national courts is deemed unadvisable due to the perception that the outsider’s case 
would be treated negatively.75  This neutrality evidences itself in the removal 
provisions in the United States Code, and by scholars.76  This provision states that a 
                                                                                                                                                        
Rules].  The fear in the time of the tradesmen was that the judges wouldn’t sufficiently comprehend the 
core of the case as the conflict may be highly specialized.  Ask the ADR Professionals, National 
Arbitration Forum, available at http://www.arb-forum.com/articles/html/ADRPro-jud-07-02.asp (last 
visited Apr. 6, 2004).  With arbitrators, selected by the parties (or by the arbitrators already appointed), 
a level of expertise and specialization can be expected.  Id.  For these highly technical issues, a 
party’s rationale may be that it is best to have an adjudicator who isn’t a judge, but does have 
extensive experience in the field.  Id. 
73 See ICC Rules, Appendix I, Article 6; see also LCIA Rules, Article 17.  With arbitration, there is no 
rule of open court and no public trials of the nature that the common law offers.  Take the Lawyers Out 
of the Loop -- Help Yourself and Your Patients, National Arbitration Forum, available at http://www.arb-
forum.com/articles/html/schroeder-01.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).  There are several advantages to 
the parties involved when confidentiality is maintained.  First, companies can safeguard their image by 
not going forward into the litigation process with their problems.  Second, confidentiality facilitates the 
continuation of business with partners.  Finally, confidentiality protects highly sensitive material, such 
as trade secrets or arms deals, from being disclosed to public scrutiny and review.  Id. 
74 Carbonneau, supra note 2, at 3.  When parties litigate across borders, either state or national, there 
are, in the natural course of business, always conflicts-of-laws problems.  An advantage of an 
arbitration agreement is that the parties know, in advance, what the applicable law is, what the 
jurisdiction is, and how, and under what law, the award will be enforced.  See ICC Rules; see also 
LCIA Rules.   
75 Arbitration push needs more funding: HK head, Lawyers Weekly, Oct. 7, 2003, available at 
http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/articles/cf/0c01a5cf.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).  An example of 
this within the borders of the United States is found in the diversity jurisdiction provision of the United 
States Code.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  The statutes confers “original jurisdiction [to federal courts] of all 
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $ 75,000, exclusive of 
interest and costs, and is between-- (1) Citizens of different States; (2) citizens of a State and citizens 
or subjects of a foreign state; (3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a 
foreign state are additional parties; and (4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as 
plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.”  Another provision which highlights a similar point 
is the removal provision of the United States Code, 28 U.S.C. §1441(a), stating “Except as otherwise 
expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district 
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the 
defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place 
where such action is pending.”  The diversity jurisdiction provision of the United States Code states 
that a federal court can hear a case between citizens of two different jurisdictions.  See Id.   
76 Interpretation of the language indicates that instead of trusting one state court or another to put 
aside possible biases, another institution, the federal court system, would step in and remove those 
biases.  This interpretation is supported by testimony offered to the Congressional Subcommittee on 
the Judiciary, given by a Professor of Law at New York University stating “It is exactly this type of bias 
leveled at out-of-state…corporate defendants which led to the creation of diversity jurisdiction…  
Diversity jurisdiction was established to protect the citizens of one state from the biases that might be 
engendered in litigating in another state against a citizen of that state.  In light of the financial stakes at 
issue in class actions, the motivation for local bias is even greater then in single action cases.   
Multinational corporations are discriminated against in some state courts which appear to be biased in 
favor of the local plaintiff's attorney or local class representative who may vote or even participate in 
the election of local judges. The Congress should step in and provide the protection which the 
Framers of the Constitution envisioned would be guaranteed when they created federal court removal 
based on diversity jurisdiction.”  Statement given by Sheila L. Birnbaum, Professor of Law, New York 
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defendant may remove the case from state court to the more impartial federal court 
and avoid the potential biases of the state court.77  Arbitration allows the parties to 
feel confident that there is no local or national bias against the foreign party.78  
Finally, the principle of neutrality also extends to the language of the proceedings,79 
the procedural and substantive rules that apply,80 the nationality of the arbitrators,81 
and the choice of representation.82 
 In the midst of the pro-arbitration movement in United States history, and 
based on the rationale described above, the community of nations met in New York 
City in 1958 to discuss uniform arbitration rules that would apply across nations.83 
 
B. New York Convention of 1958:84  General provisions and Interpretation 
 
 The United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards85 
(hereinafter New York Convention) may be the most successful United Nations 
attempt at unifying rules of law between a diversified community of nations.86  The 
New York Convention presently has one hundred and thirty-four ratifications,87 and 
                                                                                                                                                        
University before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Committee on 
the Judiciary Hearing on H.R. 3789 “Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1998”, June 18, 1998.  
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/42030.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004). 
77 § 1441.  This provision was also geared at removing cases from what, years ago, was perceived as 
a biased state court system.  Congress could have left it solely to the plaintiff, as the master of its 
complaint, to decide whether a substantial dispute between diverse parties would be adjudicated in 
state or federal court. Instead, beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress gave out-of-state 
defendants the right to remove such cases to federal court. See § 1441; see also Saint Paul Mercury 
Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 286-287 (1938) (discussing history of removal statute).  
The removal statute clearly indicates concern for the out-of-state defendant, who otherwise would 
have no control over the forum.  Saint Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 286-
287 (1938).  
78 See, e.g. § 1441; see also § 1332(a) 
79 See ICC Rules, Article 16; see also LCIA Rules, Article 17. 
80 See ICC Rules, Article 15; see also LCIA Rules, Article 14. 
81 See ICC Rules, Article 7-12; see also LCIA Rules, Article 6. 
82 See ICC Rules, Article 3; see also LCIA Rules, Article 1. 
83 See infra New York Convention of 1958. 
84 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Jun. 10, 
1958, 9 U.S.C §§ 201-208, available at http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv.htm. 
85 Having first studied this convention at McGill University in Montreal, Quebec, Canada, this author 
would like to acknowledge the name of the convention in its other official language, French, as the 
Conference Des Nations Unies Sur L’Arbutrage Commercial Convention Pour La Reconnaisance Et 
L’Execution Des Sentences Arbitrales Etrangeres. 
86 Carbonneau, supra note 2, at 770. 
87 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law:  Status of Conventions and Model Laws, 
http://www.uncitral.org/english/status/status-e.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004). 
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for the most part, receives favorable construction in national courts of ratifying 
states.88 
 The United States was initially hesitant to endorse, and ratify the New York 
Convention, expressing reluctance and skepticism about such a multilateral treaty 
and the adherence to non-national rules governing behavior and the relinquishment 
of national legal authority to an a-national system.89  However, the New York 
Convention was ratified and codified,90 by the United States in December 1970, 
twelve years after the New York Convention was opened for signature.91  As the 
ratifications of the New York Convention now stand, almost all the major international 
trading nations are parties to the New York Convention,92 and 120 nations overall.93 
 The United States Supreme Court stated: 
The goal of the Convention, and the principal purpose underlying American adoption 
and implementation of it, was to encourage the recognition and enforcement of 
commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify the 
standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are 
enforced in the signatory countries.94 
                                                 
88 Carbonneau, supra note 2, at 770. 
89 Id.  
90 9 U.S.C. §§201-08 (1970). 
91 The New York Convention was opened for signature on June 10, 1958. 
92 See e.g. United States of America, France, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Sweden, Spain, China, 
Japan, and Germany. 
93 The following nations have ratified the New York Convention:  Albania, Algeria, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, 
Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, 
Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Columbia, Costa Rica, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, 
Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United 
Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uraguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe.  http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004). 
94 Scherck v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 520 (1974); see also Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, S. Exec. Doc. E, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). 
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 The New York Convention is comprised of several general provisions.  The 
first of these provisions are in Article I.95  Article I(1) states that the New York 
Convention will apply to foreign arbitral awards.96  Article I(2) defines “arbitral 
awards” as including awards made by single arbitrators, as well as permanent arbitral 
bodies.97 Article I(3) includes the reciprocity and “commercial transactions” 
reservations that are contained within the New York Convention.98 
 The two reservations included in the New York Convention are the 
“reciprocity” reservation, and the “commercial transactions” reservation.  The 
“reciprocity” reservation states that a signatory nation need only enforce awards 
made in another State which has ratified the New York Convention.99  The 
“commercial transactions” reservation states that transactions may be construed as 
commercial under the signatory’s domestic law.100   
                                                 
95 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra 
note 83, art. 1. 
96 Id. at art. 1(1).  The provision specifically states:  “This Convention shall apply to the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the 
recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between 
persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic 
awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.”  Id. 
97 Id. at art I(2).  The provision specifically states “The term ‘arbitral awards’ shall include not only 
awards made by arbitrators appointed for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral bodies 
to which the parties have submitted.”  Id. 
98 Id. at art I(3).  The provision specifically states “When signing, ratifying or acceding to this 
Convention, or notifying extension under article X hereof, any State may on the basis of reciprocity 
declare that it will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the 
territory of another Contracting State.  It may also declare that it will apply the Convention only to 
differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as 
commercial under the national law of the State making such declaration.   
99 See Id. at art. 1, cl. 3.  The following sixty-nine nations have made the reciprocity reservation:  
Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Central African Republic, China, Croatia, Cuba, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuator, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, 
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Singapore, Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom or Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of 
Tanzania, United States of America, Venezuela, and Vietnam.  http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm 
(last visited April 6, 2004). 
100 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra 
note 83, art. 3.  The following forty-one nations have made the “commercial” under domestic law 
reservation:  Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Bahrain, Barbados, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Botswana, Central African Republic, China, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Denmark, Ecuador, 
Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Jamaica, 
Madagascar, Malaysia, Monaco, Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United States of America, Venezuela, and Vietnam. 
http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm (last visited April 6, 2004). 
Revista Contraponto | vol. 1 n. 1 | jan./jul. 2014                                                                                  159 
 
 Courts have narrowly construed these reservations.  The reciprocity 
reservation in Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc.101 was an example of this 
narrow construction.102  Fertilizer Corporation of India (hereinafter FCI), which was 
entirely owned by the government of India, entered into a contract with IDI 
Management, Inc. (hereinafter IDI), a United States corporation, to build a 
nitrophosphate plant near Bombay, India.103  After completion of the plant, a dispute 
ensued and the matter was submitted to arbitration in India as per the contract 
terms.104  As a result of the arbitration, FCI prevailed, and sought to enforce the 
arbitration award in the United States.105  IDI challenged the award, arguing that 
there was a lack of reciprocity as India had “adopted various evasive devices…to 
avoid enforcement of awards adverse to Indian parties.”106  The United States District 
Court held that reciprocity only required that India be a signatory to the New York 
Convention.107  The Court further held that the meaning of reciprocity did not include 
the adoption or interpretation of the commercial reservation, or the mechanisms for 
enforcement in the Contracting State where the award was issued.108 
 The “commercial” reservation has also been narrowly interpreted.  The 
enacting legislation provides in pertinent part “an arbitration agreement or arbitral 
award arising out of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which is 
considered as commercial, including a transaction, contract, or agreement described 
in section 2 of this title, falls under the New York Convention.”109   
In Sumitomo Corp v. Parakopi Compania Maritima110 several Japanese 
corporations brought an action against Parakopi, a Panamanian corporation with its 
principle place of business in Greece, in United States District Court.111  Parakopi 
challenged the jurisdiction of the United States court claiming that this was not a 
“commercial” transaction under United States law, as both parties were foreign to the 
                                                 
101 Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio 1981, reh’g denied, 530 F. 
Supp. 542 (S.D. Ohio 1982). 
102 See, e.g. Id. 
103 Id. at 950. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id at 952. 
107 Corp. of India, 517 F. Supp. at 952. 
108 McLaughlin, supra note 70, at 284, n45. 
109 9 U.S.C. §202. 
110 Sumitomo Corp. v. Parikopi Compania Martima, 477 F. Supp 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff’d 620 F.2d 
286 (2d Cir. 1980). 
111 Id. at 738. 
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United States.112  The court held “[t]o hold that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking 
where the parties involved are all foreign entities would certainly undermine the goal 
of encouraging the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements in 
international contracts.”113  In getting to this rationale, the court concluded that the 
definition of “commerce” under the FAA114 could not be applied to limit the application 
of the New York Convention.115 
 Other important general provisions of the New York Convention are contained 
within Articles III and IV.116  These articles, taken together, show both that a State 
may not impose “substantially more onerous conditions…on the recognition or 
enforcement of arbitral awards…than are imposed on the recognition of domestic 
arbitral awards,”117 and the procedure that a party must go through to obtain 
enforcement of an award.118 
 The final general provision that is contained within the New York Convention is 
Article V, wherein lies the continued strength of the New York Convention.119  There 
are only seven grounds upon which enforcement of an award can be blocked.  The 
party seeking to block enforcement of the award bears the burden of showing that 
one of the grounds apply.  The grounds are divided into two subsections, with five 
grounds stated in subsection (1), and two grounds stated in subsection (2).   
The first set of grounds to bar enforcement of the award relate to procedural 
grounds.  The first ground is that existed, at the time of the agreement, a party who 
                                                 
112 Id. at 739. 
113 Id at 741. 
114 9 U.S.C. §1; “Commerce” is defined as “commerce among the several States or with foreign 
nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Comumbia, or between any such 
Territory and another, or between any such Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the 
District of Columbia and any State or Territory or foreign nation.”  Sumitomo Corp. v. Parikopi 
Compania Martima, 477 F. Supp 737. 
115 Sumitomo Corp., 477 F. Supp at 741; see 9 U.S.C. §208 (the residual application provision) 
116 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra 
note 83, art. 3.  Article 3 states:  “Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding 
and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied 
upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed substantially 
more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral 
awards to which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of 
domestic arbitral awards.”  Id.  Article 4 states:  “1. To obtain the recognition and enforcement 
mentioned in the preceding article, the party applying for recognition and enforcement shall, at the 
time of the application, supply:  (a) The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy 
thereof; (b) The original agreement referred to in article II or a duly certified copy thereof.  Id. at art. 4. 
117 Id. at art. 3. 
118 Id. at art. 4. 
119 McLaughlin, supra note 70, at 280. 
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was suffering from an incapacity.120  The second ground covers situations where 
proper notice was not given against the party who the award is invoked against,121 
and the third ground deals with issues outside of the submission to arbitration.122  
The fourth ground to bar enforcement of the award arises if the composition of the 
arbitral authority was against the agreement of the parties,123 and the fifth ground 
arises if the award has not yet become binding on the parties.124   
The remaining two grounds relate to substantive reasons to bar enforcement 
of the award.  The first ground to bar enforcement is where the subject matter of the 
arbitration is not capable of settlement under the laws of the country where the 
arbitration took place.125  The second ground is triggered when the public policy of 
the country of recognition or enforcement is contrary to the award that was issued.126 
Those are the only seven grounds upon which enforcement of an award can 
be blocked, and the party wishing to block the enforcement of the award bears the 
burden of showing that one of the seven grounds exists.127 
 
C. Enforcement of Awards 
 
 The general policy of United States courts is that arbitral awards are generally 
enforceable.128  The boundaries of this general policy extend beyond where a party 
                                                 
120 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra 
note 83, art. 5(1)(a).  The provision states:  “The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, 
under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid under the 
law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law of the 
country where the award was made.”  Id.  
121 Id. at art. 5(1)(b).  The provision states:  “The party against whom the award is invoked was not 
given proper notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was 
otherwise unable to present his case.” 
122 Id. at art. 5(1)(c).  The provision states:  “The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or 
not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond 
the scope of the submission to arbitration…”  Id.  
123 Id. at art. 5(1)(d).  The provision states:  “The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral 
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was 
not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place.”  Id. 
124 Id. at art. 5(1)(e).  The provision states:  “The award has not yet become binding, on the parties, or 
has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of 
which, that award was made.”  Id. 
125 Id. at art. 5(2)(a).  The provision states:  “The subject matter of the difference is not capable of 
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country.”  Id. 
126 Id. at art. 5(2)(b).  The provision states:  “The recognition or enforcement of the award would be 
contrary to the public policy of that country.”  Id. 
127 McLaughlin, supra note 70, at 280. 
128 See, e.g. Borup v. Toluca Pacific Securities Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20518 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 
1997); see also Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 782 (11th Cir. 1993); see also 
Rodriguez v. Prudential-Bache Secutiries, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1202, 1207-08 (D.P.R. 1995). 
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was not effectively represented by counsel, as in Borop v. Toluca Pacific Securities 
Corp.129  The District Court extended the rule of limited review of arbitral awards 
further when it also held that an award can only be reviewed based on the grounds 
listed in Sections 10 and 11 of the FAA.130  In Borop, the investor filed for arbitration 
against a corporation, alleging that the corporation forced his purchase of “highly 
speculative stocks” through, inter alia, misrepresentations concerning the 
investments.131  The arbitrator found for the investor, and subsequently sought 
enforcement of the award.132  The court found that “an arbitration award could be 
vacated only where the award was obtained through fraud or other misconduct” and 
that “considerable deference” should be given to an arbitral award.133  Furthermore, 
the court held that “absent fraudulent or improper conduct, defective notice could not 
justify an order vacating an arbitration award,”134 firmly supporting the judicial 
doctrine of narrow review, as seen in cases like Borop.135 
 The aforementioned, almost unmitigated, support for narrow review of awards 
has several exceptions that allow courts to review the award.  There are only seven 
grounds upon which a court may review an award, and the two important grounds, 
that are the main source of difficulty for review of arbitral awards, are the public policy 
exception and the exception for arbitrary and capricious awards. 
 The public policy exception is articulated in Article V(2)(b) of the New York 
Convention, which states that an award may not be recognized if the “recognition or 
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of [this] country.”136  
This exception is articulated in such cases as Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, 
Inc., where the court held that a court may refuse to enforce an arbitration award 
where enforcement would violate “some explicit public policy” that is “well defined 
and dominant” that is to be taken from laws and legal precedents, and not merely 
general considerations of public interests.137 
                                                 
129 Borup v. Toluca Pacific Securities Corp., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20518 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 1997). 
130 Id. at *2. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at *4. 
133 Id. at *6. 
134 Id. at *9. 
135 See e.g., Fine v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 824, 827; see also Elijer Mfg., Inc. v. 
Kowin Development Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1253-54 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1205 (1994). 
136 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra 
note 83, art. 5. 
137 Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 782 (11th Cir. 1993); see also Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen’s Union, 11 F.3d 1189, 1194096 (3rd Cir. 1993) (holding that an able 
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 The public policy exception has also been articulated in Rodriguez v. 
Prudential-Bache Secutiries, Inc..138  Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc.'s (Prudential) 
withdrew from the Puerto Rico market, and the there was a subsequent termination 
from employment of several top executives assigned to the Puerto Rico office.139  
Jose' F. Rodriguez, former President of Prudential-Bache Capital Funding Puerto 
Rico, Inc. filed an action against defendant Prudential, seeking compensation for his 
wrongful termination, which he claimed was in violation of a contractual agreement 
which provided in part that plaintiff could not be terminated except for just cause.140  
Meanwhile, another group of executives chose to bring forth their own claims directly 
through arbitration.141 
An arbitration panel was appointed by the New York Stock Exchange.142  The 
panel issued its arbitration award, in which Prudential was ordered to pay the amount 
of $2,881,775 to several executives, in addition to various amounts in costs and 
attorney's fees.143  Jose Rodriguez petitioned the Court for entry of judgment on the 
arbitration award.144  Instead of making payment in satisfaction of the award, 
however, Prudential filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award as against all 
claimants, on the several grounds, including that the award is against public policy.145  
The Court found that the panel did have before it evidence which tended to act 
against Prudential's argument that the transactions at issue were unauthorized.146 
 A case that highlights the United States position on the public policy exception 
is W.R. Grace and Co.147  Employees of the petitioner filed suit for damages under 
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the 
respondent union.148 During a strike, the employer hired women as strike 
replacements.149 After the employer and the union signed a new collective bargaining 
                                                                                                                                                        
bodied seaman was not discharged for good cause when a breathalyzer test revealed that he had a 
blood alcohol content that was three times the maximum permitted by the Coast Guard regulations 
because the shipping company's policy did not require that result.). 
138 Rodriguez v. Prudential-Bache Secutiries, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 1202, 1207-08 (D.P.R. 1995). 
139 Id. at 1205. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Rodriguez, 882 F.Supp. at 1205. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 1208-09. 
147 W.R. Grace and Co. v. Local Union 759, Int’l Union of United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 
(1983). 
148 Id. at 759. 
149 Id. at 759-60. 
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agreement continuing the seniority system, the employer kept the female strike 
workers preventing men from exercising seniority.150  The employer also signed a 
conciliation agreement with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
providing that in the event of layoffs the employer would maintain the existing 
proportion of women.151  The men who would have been protected under seniority 
provisions of the bargaining agreement filed grievances against the employer 
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement.152  The Court affirmed enforcement 
of the arbitration award, which was rendered in favor of the male employees.153  The 
Court held that because the employer voluntarily assumed the obligations under the 
collective bargaining agreement, it was bound by those terms and could not cure its 
breach by relying on an erroneous lower court's finding that the conciliation 
agreement alone was binding.154 
If the contract as interpreted violates some explicit public policy, the courts are 
obliged to refrain from enforcing it.155  Such a public policy, however, must be well 
defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal 
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.156  In 
this case, the Company actually complied with the District Court's order, and nothing 
in the Record led the Court to believe that it would disobey the order if presented with 
the same dilemma in the future.157  In addition to possible contempt sanctions, the 
Company faced possible Title VII liability if it departed from the conciliation 
agreement in conducting its layoffs.158  The Company was cornered by its own 
actions, and the Court held that it cannot argue that liability under the collective-
bargaining agreement violated public policy.159 
 The exception that prevents arbitrary or capricious awards applies when the 
award exhibits a “wholesale departure from the law” or when the award is not 
“grounded in the contract which provides for the arbitration.”160  As the Court in 
Ainsworth v. Skurnick held, “that although great deference is normally accorded an 
                                                 
150 Id. at 760. 
151 Id. at 761. 
152 Id. 
153 W.R. Grace and Co., 461 U.S. at 761-62. 
154 See Id. 
155 Id. at 766. 
156 Id. 
157 W.R. Grace and Co., 461 U.S. at 769. 
158 Id. at 769-70. 
159 Id. at 770. 
160 Brown, 994 F.2d at 781.  
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arbitration award, an award that is arbitrary or capricious is not required to be 
enforced.”161  This high standard is met only if the arbitrator’s decision can not be 
inferred from the facts of the case.162 
 As the Skurnick court correctly stated, great deference is usually given to an 
arbitral award.163  While United States courts have a mechanism to review arbitral 
awards, the public policy exception and the exception for arbitrary or capricious 
awards are narrow exceptions, an difficult to meet.  In the United States, however, 
there are some arbitral awards are vacated due to the decisions falling within the 
scope of these exceptions.164  This point will be examined later in the work with more 
significant analysis.165 
 
Backbone of US transnational arbitration policy166 
 
 Relying on both domestic and international law, the United States Supreme 
Court has cultivated international arbitration policy through its case law and basic 
principles.  The principle of contract law in the United States weighs heavily in this 
discussion, as do three major cases that developed the domestic law of, and the 
Supreme Court’s policy on, international arbitration.  The basic contract principles of 
the United States enter into this discussion as arbitration is largely based upon a 
contract drafted by the two parties that are engaging in the arbitration.  
Understanding these principles provide great insight in examining the holdings of the 
United States Supreme Court with regard to transnational arbitration cases.  The 
cases that apply contract principles and set precedent for future discussion and 
interpretation are:  The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co,167 Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver,168 and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrystler-Plymouth, Inc.169 
 
 
                                                 
161 Ainswoth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 941 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 915 (1993). 
162 Id. 
163 Id.  
164 See e.g., United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987). 
165 See infra Parts VI and VII. 
166 The author wishes to express that much more extensive summaries of the following cases are 
available elsewhere.  The point in mentioning these cases is not to summarize them wholly, but rather 
to afford the reader a sense of the transnational arbitration policy of the United States in action. 
167 See infra note 180. 
168 See infra note 193. 
169 See infra note 211. 
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A. United States Contract Principles 
 
Within the realm of arbitration, both domestically, and internationally, the 
United States Supreme Court affords much leeway.170  So much leeway is given, in 
fact, that the parties can contract to alter the federalization of arbitration 
accomplished by the FAA.  In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, the parties 
modified the provisions of the FAA itself through a written stipulation.171  First Options 
of Chicago, Inc. (First Options) cleared stock trades for the investment company, 
which incurred substantial losses in its trading account.172  First Options and the 
investment company entered into an agreement for repayment of the debt.173  When 
the investment company lost additional money, First Options demanded immediate 
repayment and insisted that the stock trader and his wife personally pay any 
deficiency.174  First Options sought arbitration under the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 
et seq.175  Neither the stock trader nor his wife had personally signed the repayment 
agreement, and they argued the arbitrability of the dispute with First Options.176  
Ultimately, the Court unanimously found that the contract of arbitration was the true 
source of final authority on the question of arbitrability, strengthening the idea of 
liberty of contract in issues involving arbitration.177 
Generally speaking, the modern Court affords great protection to contracts 
involving international transactions, due in large part to the realities of the globalized 
                                                 
170 State, and not federal, law typically governs enforcement of foreign judgments.  McCord v. Jet 
Spray Int’l Corp., 874 F.Supp. 436, 438 (D. Mass. 1994) (concluding a majority of cases regarding 
enforcement of foreign judgments have applied state law, when a federal court’s diversity jurisdiction is 
invoked).  See also Restatement, 2d, Conflict of Laws § 98 cmt. c (1989).  McCord did not pertain to 
enforcement of an arbitral award.  McCord, 874 F.Supp. 436.  However, state law generally governs 
contract validity, unless the contract allegedly violates a federal statute or treaty.  Presumably, a party 
could invoke federal question jurisdiction by requesting a declaratory judgment pertaining to the New 
York Convention.  If the amount in controversy is not met, a party opposing the enforcement of an 
arbitration clause and seeking a declaratory judgment would have to sue in state court and the foreign 
party could not remove the case to federal court by raising a federal question defense.  Thus, results 
might depend on who initiates litigation.  
171 First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
172 Id. at 940. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 941. 
177 See generally First Options of Chicago, Inc., 514 U.S. 938 (holding that the Court of Appeals 
correctly held the arbitrability of the dispute between the clearinghouse and the stock trader and his 
wife was subject to independent review by the courts. 
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community that the United States is a member of.178  The Supreme Court, for 
instance, has affirmed and deferred to forum selection clauses, and clauses in 
international contracts, generally, when the Court finds that the transaction was made 
at arms length.179   
 
B. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.180 
 
The ability to write a forum selection clause into an arbitration clause of a 
contract is one of the cornerstones international arbitration.181  Uncertainty, as well as 
great inconvenience could arise if a lawsuit could be maintained in any jurisdiction in 
which an accident might occur or if jurisdiction were left to any place where personal 
jurisdiction might be established.182  The elimination of all such uncertainties by 
agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable 
element in international trade, commerce, and contracting.183  
Petitioner Unterweser made an agreement to tow respondent's drilling rig from 
Louisiana to Italy.184  The contract contained a forum-selection clause providing for 
the litigation of any dispute in the High Court of Justice in London.185  When the rig 
under tow was damaged in a storm, respondent instructed Unterweser to tow the rig 
to Tampa, the nearest port of refuge.186  There, respondent brought suit in admiralty 
against petitioners.187  Unterweser invoked the forum clause in moving for dismissal 
for want of jurisdiction and brought suit in the English court, which ruled that it had 
jurisdiction under the contractual forum provision.188  The District Court, relying on 
                                                 
178 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974); see also The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore 
Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrystler-Plymouth, Inc, 473 U.S. 
614 (1985). 
179 See e.g. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); see also Southland Corp. v. 
Keaton, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrystler-Plymouth, Inc, 473 
U.S. 614 (1985); see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). 
180 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
181 See e.g. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); see also Southland Corp. v. 
Keaton, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrystler-Plymouth, Inc, 473 
U.S. 614 (1985); see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). 
182 See Carbonneau, supra note 2 (discussing jurisdiction as well as uncertainty in arbitration 
proceedings). 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 2. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at 3. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 4. 
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Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The Monrosa,189 held the forum-selection clause 
unenforceable, and refused to decline jurisdiction on the basis of forum non 
conveniens.190  The Court of Appeals affirmed.191  
The United States Supreme Court held that the forum-selection clause, which 
was a vital part of the towing contract, is binding on the parties unless respondent 
can meet the heavy burden of showing that its enforcement would be unreasonable, 
unfair, or unjust.192 
 
C. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver193 
 
 The idea of enforcing a forum selection clause is not an isolated one, and in 
fact, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld this idea.194  Another such example 
is found in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver.195 Respondent, an American manufacturer 
based in Illinois, in order to expand its overseas operations, purchased from 
petitioner, a German citizen, three enterprises owned by him and organized under 
the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein, together with all trademark rights of these 
enterprises.196  The sales contract, which was negotiated in the United States, 
England, and Germany, signed in Austria, and closed in Switzerland, contained 
express warranties by petitioner that the trademarks were unencumbered.197  
Moreover, the sales contract contained a clause providing that "any controversy or 
claim [that] shall arise out of this agreement or the breach thereof" would be referred 
to arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France, and 
that Illinois laws would govern the agreement and its interpretation and 
performance.198   After allegedly discovering that the trademarks were subject to 
substantial encumbrances, the Respondent offered to rescind the contract, but the 
petitioner refused.  The Respondent brought suit in District Court for damages, 
                                                 
189 Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (1958) (declining jurisdiction because the 
exclusionary clause in the bills of lading was not applicable to exporter's in rem proceeding against 
respondent ship). 
190 The Bremem, 407 U.S. at 4. 
191 Id. at 7. 
192 See generally Id. at 8-20. 
193 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). 
194 See, e.g. The Bremen, 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
195 See Scherk, 417 U.S. 506. 
196 Id. at 508. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
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alleging that Petitioner's fraudulent representations concerning the trademark rights 
violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.199  Petitioner moved to dismiss the 
action or alternatively to stay the action pending arbitration, but the District Court 
denied the motion to dismiss and preliminarily enjoined petitioner from proceeding 
with arbitration, holding, in reliance on Wilko v. Swan,200 that the arbitration clause 
was unenforceable.201  The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s ruling.202 
The United States Supreme Court, however, held that the arbitration clause is 
to be respected and enforced by federal courts in accord with the explicit provisions 
of the United States Arbitration Act.203  An arbitration agreement, such as is here 
involved, "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."204 
The Supreme Court further held that since uncertainty will almost inevitably 
exist with respect to any contract, such as the one in question here, with substantial 
contacts in two or more countries, each with its own substantive laws and conflict-of-
laws rules, a special clause is needed.205  This clause is a contractual provision 
specifying in advance the forum for litigating disputes and the law to be applied is an 
almost indispensable precondition to achieving the orderliness and predictability 
essential to any international business transaction.  Such a provision obviates the 
danger that a contract dispute might be submitted to a forum hostile to the interests 
of one of the parties or unfamiliar with the problem area involved.206  Moreover, in the 
context of an international contract, the advantages that a security buyer may 
possess in having a wide choice of American courts and venue in which to litigate his 
claims of violations of the securities laws.207  This is unrealistic as an opposing party 
may, by speedy resort to a foreign court, block or hinder access to the American 
court of the buyer's choice.208  Lastly, the Supreme Court held that an agreement to 
arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection 
clause that considers the venue of the lawsuit, but also the procedure to be used in 
                                                 
199 15 U.S.C. § 78j.  Specifically, the Petitioners allege that the Respondent’s practices violated § 10(b) 
of the Securities and Exchange Act.  Id. 
200 Wilko, 346 U.S. 427. 
201 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 509. 
202 Id. at 510. 
203 See Id. 
204 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510-20 (discussing 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 and Wilko v. Swan, 436 U.S. 427 (1953)). 
205 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. at 515-17. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 517-18. 
208 Id. 
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resolving the dispute.209  The invalidation of the arbitration clause in this case would 
not only allow respondent to repudiate its solemn promise but would, as well, reflect a 
"parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our 
courts."210 
 
D. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrystler-Plymouth, Inc.211 
 
Another case that applies the broad contract principles that apply in 
international matters is Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrystler Plymouth, Inc.212  
Mitsubishi Motors Corp, a Japanese corporation, is the result of a joint venture with 
the goal of distributing automobiles aimed at distributing automobiles through 
Chrysler dealers outside of the continental United States.213  Respondent, a Puerto 
Rico corporation, entered into distribution and sales agreements with Chrysler 
International, S.A., a company that joined together with other companies to comprise 
Mitsubishi. The sales agreement between the Petitioner and Respondent contained 
an arbitration clause where the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association would 
arbitrate any disputes arising out of the agreement (or for the breach thereof).214  
After attempts to resolve disputes concerning a declining sale of new cars failed, the 
Petitioner withheld shipment of automobiles to Respondent.215  The Respondent did 
not claim responsibility for the withheld automobiles.216  Following Respondent’s 
disclaimer, Petitioner brought a lawsuit under the FAA and the New York Convention, 
seeking an order “to compel arbitration of the disputes in accordance with the 
arbitration clause.”217  Respondent asserted, inter alia, causes of action under the 
Sherman Act and other statutes.218 
The District Court ordered arbitration of most of the issues raised in the 
complaint and counterclaims, including the federal antitrust issues.219  Despite the 
                                                 
209 Id. at 519. 
210 The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9. 
211 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrystler-Plymouth, Inc, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
212 See Id. 
213 Id. at 616.  
214 Id. at 617. 
215 Id. at 618. 
216 Id. 
217 Id.  
218 Id. at 620. 
219 Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 620-21. 
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doctrine established by American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co.,220 
and uniformly followed by the Courts of Appeals, that rights conferred by the antitrust 
laws are inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration.  The District Court in , relying 
on Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,221 held that the international character of the 
undertaking in question required enforcement of the arbitration clause even as to the 
antitrust claims.222  The Court of Appeals reversed insofar as the District Court 
ordered submission of the antitrust claims to arbitration.223 
The Supreme Court held that there is no merit to respondent's contention that 
because it falls within the class for whose benefit the statutes specified in the 
counterclaims were passed, but the arbitration clause at issue does not mention 
these statutes or statutes in general, the clause cannot be properly read to 
contemplate arbitration of these statutory claims.224  Moreover, the Supreme Court 
held that there is no reason to depart from the federal policy favoring arbitration 
where a party bound by an arbitration agreement raises claims founded on statutory 
rights.225 
The Supreme Court also held that respondent's antitrust claims are arbitrable 
pursuant to the Arbitration Act. 226  Concerns of international comity, respect for the 
capacities and limitations of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the 
need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of 
disputes, all require enforcement of the arbitration clause in question, even assuming 
that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.227  The strong 
presumption in favor of freely negotiated contractual choice-of-forum provisions is 
reinforced here by the federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution, a policy 
that applies with special force in the field of international commerce.228  The mere 
appearance of an antitrust dispute does not alone warrant invalidation of the selected 
forum on the undemonstrated assumption that the arbitration clause is tainted. 229  In 
addition, the potential complexity of antitrust matters does not suffice to ward off 
                                                 
220 American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2nd Cir. 1968). 
221 Scherk, 417 U.S. 505 (1974). 
222 Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 621. 
223 Id. 
224 See e.g. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 624-28. 
225 See e.g. Id. 
226 See Scherk, 417 U.S. 505 (1974). 
227 See e.g. Id. 
228 See e.g. Id. 
229 See e.g. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628-40. 
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arbitration; nor does an arbitration panel pose too great a danger of innate hostility to 
the constraints on business conduct that antitrust law imposes.230  Moreover, the 
importance of the private damages remedy in enforcing the regime of antitrust laws 
does not compel the conclusion that such remedy may not be sought outside an 
American court.231 
 
Realities of transnational business 
 
The world as it is now is far different than the world that was just decades ago, 
much less centuries ago.  In the last few decades, there have been rapid innovations 
in computers and banking technology that allows funds to be transferred from 
anywhere in the world to almost anywhere else in the world.  In addition, innovations 
in information science allow people to conduct business across hemispheres and 
continents at the push of a button, enhancing the interconnectedness of the world, 
making the Earth one large, global marketplace. 
World Trade Organization statistics provide a mechanism to offer an idea of 
the quantity and volume of business that is done worldwide, on an annual basis.  In 
the area of commercial services, the United States is both the largest exporter and 
importer, with value of 272.6 billion dollars, and 205.6 billion dollars, respectively, in 
2002.232  The United Kingdom followed closely behind, with 123.1 billion dollars of 
exports of commercial services, and 101.4 billion dollars of imports of commercial 
services.233  Germany also placed high on the list, with 99.6 billion dollars of exports, 
and 149.1 billion dollars of imports in 2002.234  Overall, in 2002, the top five nations 
had 646.1 billion dollars of commercial services exports and 630.9 billion dollars of 
commercial services imports.235  Western Europe, a growing hotspot of international 
arbitration, had a total of 3.336 trillion dollars of commercial service exports and 
                                                 
230 See e.g. Id. 
231 See e.g. Id. 
232 World Trade Organization, supra note 3, at 23. 
233 Id. 
234 Id. 
235 Id.  The top five importing and exporting nations are the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, France, and Japan.  Id. 
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goods in 2002 and 3.147 trillion dollars of commercial services imports and goods in 
2002.236 
Without any means of comparison, a trade statistic is merely a number.  The 
World Trade Organization also publishes trade data from 1950 until the present.  This 
information reveals that since 1995, world gross domestic product has grown by 
20%;237 since 1980, this figure has grown by 176%;238 and since 1950, that figure 
has grown by 706%.239  The realities of the world today, as evidenced from data 
collected on world trade and gross domestic product are that the world today is as 
connected and globalized.  There is more trade and business occurring now than 
ever before, and this creates a whole new set of challenges, especially in 
international arbitration, for the new, transnational world. 
It is this staggering amount of business that is done on a daily, weekly, and 
yearly basis that makes different interpretations of treaties like the New York 
Convention troublesome.  The interpretation that the United States offers is not the 
same as other countries around the world, which can expose businesses with assets 
in foreign countries, an ever-increasing number in today’s globalized world, to 
unfavorable judgments and awards rendered against them. 
 
Recognition of judgments against United States domiciliaries 
 
A. Recognition versus enforcement 
 
Courts as well as litigants often confuse “recognition” of judgments with 
“enforcement” of those same judgments, though recognition does not guarantee 
enforcement.240  Recognition of a foreign judgment is a prerequisite to enforcement 
and this occurs when a United States court finds that a matter has been adequately 
decided by a foreign court and does not need to be further litigated in a United States 
court.241  Enforcement is present when a United States court grants the relief ordered 
                                                 
236 Id. at 24.  Another growing area of international commercial arbitration is the Asia/Pacific region.  In 
2002, the Asia/Pacific region had 2.097 trillion dollars of commercial services exports and goods, and 
1.913 trillion dollars of commercial services imports and goods.  Id. 
237 Id. at 167. 
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240 Jonathan H. Pittman, Comment, The Public Policy Exception to the Recognition of Foreign 
Judgments, 22 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 969, 970 (1989). 
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by the foreign judgment.242  For the most part, **INSERT** validation of the foreign 
judgment, and not enforcement, is sought by the moving party.243 
 
B. Why recognize foreign judgments? 
 
The precedent for recognition and enforcement in the United States is Hilton v. 
Guyot.244  In Hilton, Plaintiffs sued defendants in a French court under a contract 
claim.  Defendants alleged fraud on the part of plaintiffs, and sought an injunction 
from bringing suit, but the court would not admit evidence and entered a directed 
verdict for plaintiff.245  The judgment was affirmed in a French appeals court.  
Defendant then sought review in the United States.246  The Court found that comity 
was reciprocal.  Because France did not recognize final judgments of the United 
States, and would try such judgments anew, French judgments would be given the 
same treatment.247  Thus, the comity of the United States did not require the Court to 
give conclusive effect to the judgments of the courts of France,248 and the defendants 
could receive a new trial.249 
While comity is one theory as to why recognition of judgments in United States 
courts is permitted, a similar concept in enforcement of international judgments is 
reciprocity.  The Court in Sangiovanni Hernandez wrote that recognition of foreign 
state judgments may be “motivated by a desire for reciprocal treatment of American 
judgments abroad.”250  Finally, reliance on consistent dispute resolution method is a 
critical element for the promulgation of international transactions, especially when 
banking and finance goes across borders. 
                                                 
242 Id. 
243 Id. (A moving defendant may seek recognition of a foreign judgment against a plaintiff as 
antecedent to filing a motion to dismiss claim on res judicata grounds.  Similarly, a plaintiff may seek 
recognition of a foreign judgment against a defendant  as offensive collateral estoppel). 
244 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S.113 (1895). 
245 Id. at 227. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. at 228. 
248 Id. 
249 Id. at 229. 
250 Sangiovanni Hernandez v. Domenicana de Aviacion, C. por A., 556 F.2d 611, 614 (1st Cir. 1977). 
The Hilton reciprocity requirement was removed as an element in the enforcement of foreign 
judgments under federal law.  See Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 867 & n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  In 
addition, there is no federal legislation mandating reciprocity.  See Id.  Finally, the New York 
Convention uses the word “may” in the reciprocity reservation, indicating that applicability of the 
reciprocity doctrine is discretionary.  See New York Convention. 
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C. In-tandem251 and second-look252 arguments 
 
In the majority opinion of Mitsubishi, there are two arguments that are 
advanced that suggest that the policy of United States courts may not be as affording 
to recognition of judgments as previously suggested by the comity and reciprocity 
arguments advanced earlier.  The pertinent portion of footnote 19 of Mitsubishi states 
“[w]e merely note that in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses 
operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory 
remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the 
agreement as against public policy.”253 
 The second-look doctrine states that “the national courts of the United States 
will have the opportunity at the award-enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate 
interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws has been addressed.”254 
 These doctrines operate to alleviate and allay fears that complete and total 
legal authority in matters of international business were not forfeited to international 
arbitrators.  However, this attempt at calming fear that arbitrators have power over 
United States courts was counteracted by the same Mitsubishi court in a later 
footnote.  The Court stated “the utility of the New York Convention in promoting the 
process of international commercial arbitration depends upon the willingness of 
national courts to let go of matters they normally would think of as their own.”255  The 
door that was seemingly opened by the “in tandem” footnote was closed and the 
argument that it represented, eviscerated by this language.  The short sum of this 
statement is that the strong preference for international comity and reciprocation is 
still in force, and while there is a mechanism for review of judgments, that it will likely 
only be used in the most extreme of cases. 
 
Peril of loose international policy in a globalized world 
 
 It goes without saying that every country in the world does not have the same 
laws and policy as does the United States.  However, the very existence of the New 
                                                 
251 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 637, n. 19. 
252 See Id. at 632. 
253 Id. at 637, n. 19. 
254 Id. at 632. 
255 Id. at 639 n.21. 
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York Convention supports that statement.  With no real uniform law across nations, 
and widely varying interpretation of policy applicable to enforcement of arbitrations, it 
can be expected that the enforcement of awards will not be uniform across those 
same nations.  Two notable deviations from the United States’ interpretation of the 
New York Convention are Germany and Belgium. 
 
A. Germany 
 
 If a party sought to have a foreign arbitral award enforced in West Germany,256 
both the German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO) and any applicable treaties or 
conventions must be considered.257  Section 723(1) of the ZPO was the basic West 
German Code provision concerning enforcement of foreign judgments.258  That 
section states that West German courts would enforce foreign court judgments 
without examining the merits of the dispute that they are enforcing.259  This provision 
allowed German courts to differ substantially from courts in the United States.  West 
German courts did not, generally speaking, examine the legal standards of the 
judgment rendering forum in making a determination of its enforceability.260 
 While the standards set forth by the West German ZPO were more lax than 
United States rules, there were provisions that set forth exceptions to section 
723(1).261  723(2) and 328 of the ZPO articulated six exceptions to the requirement of 
general enforcement set forth in section 723(1).262  First, the foreign judgment must 
be final before enforcement was offered.263  Second, the foreign judgment could not 
be contrary to the public policy of West Germany.264  Third, the court that decided the 
foreign judgment must have personal jurisdiction over the case.265  Fourth, the ZPO 
required that the judgment debtor must have been served in the foreign action by one 
                                                 
256 Information on West Germany was obtained from an article written in the Law and Policy in 
International Business Journal, published in 1987, prior to unification of East and West Germany. 
257 David Westin, Enforcing Foreign Commercial Judgments and Arbitral Awards in the United States, 
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of the means specified under West German law.266  Fifth, the ZPO provided that a 
foreign judgment cannot be enforced in West Germany “if reciprocity is not 
warranted.”267  The final exception provided by the ZPO was that judgments contrary 
to West German public policy for matrimonial and family law actions did not have to 
be enforced.268 
 Germany rules for enforcement of a foreign judgment are certainly more lax 
than those of the United States.  Both procedurally and substantively, the German 
rules cause German courts to dig less deep than courts of the United States.  While 
these rules allow for a more lax system than the United States, there are systems 
that are much more lax in looking at the merits of the arbitration than West Germany. 
 
B. Belgium 
 
 In 1985, Belgians amended their Code judiciaire to provide that if all parties 
are non-Belgian, an award rendered in Belgium is not subject to an action for 
annulment.  Article 17 of the Belgian code judiciaire provides: 
“Courts of Belgium may hear a request for annulment only if at least one of the 
parties to the dispute decided by the award is either a physical person having 
nationality or residence or a legal entity created in Belgium or having a Belgian 
branch or other seat of operation.”269 
        The Belgian statutory language is mandatory and offers no possibility for 
foreigners to choose Belgian judicial review.270  This “totally unbound” arbitration has 
been favorably received by some international businessmen.  Domestic Belgian 
courts may intervene at pre-award stages.  These interventions would be to aid the 
                                                 
266 Id. at 340-41. 
267 Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] § 328(1)5; see Westin, supra note 256, at 341. 
268 Id. 
269 The French text of the Code Judiciaire from the enacting law of March 27, 1985 read: « Les 
tribunaux belges ne peuvent connaitre d’une demande en annulation que lorsqu’au moins une partie 
au differend tranche par la sentence arbitrale est soit une personne physique ayant la nationalite 
belge ou une residence en Belgique, soit une personne morale constituee en Belgique ou y ayant une 
succursale ou un siege quelconque d’operation. The Code was later amended to take the harsh 
surprise out of litigating in Belgian courts”. The new text reads: “The parties may, by an express 
statement in the arbitration agreement or by a subsequent agreement, exclude any application to set 
aside the arbitral award where none of the parties is either an individual of Belgian nationality or 
residing in Belgium, or a legal person having its head office or a branch there.” This new text is 
drastically different than the original text, but clearly highlights the potential perils of having foreign 
judgments litigated in other, still foreign countries. 
270 William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice:  Safeguarding Procedural Integrity in 
International Arbitration, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 647, 694 (1989). 
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arbitration by nominating arbitrators, gathering evidence and provisional measures to 
preserve property.271  As Belgium is a signatory to the New York Convention, 
discussed supra, awards made under Belgian law will be recognized and given full 
force and effect.272  The winner of such an arbitration, where there can be no judicial 
review, would then take the award to a country where the loser has assets.  The loser 
will obviously contest this proceeding, saying that the arbitration was unfair, or 
improper in some way, and the court of enforcement will be handcuffed by the 
language of the New York Convention to enforce the award at the expense of the 
loser because that is what the loser contracted for when they signed the agreement 
to arbitrate.273 
 The agreement to arbitrate internationally is a sacred contract of sorts.  As 
the Mitsubishi court stated in footnote 21, “the utility of the Convention in promoting 
the process of international commercial arbitration depends upon the willingness of 
national courts to let go of matters they normally would think of as their own.”274  This 
willingness to forgo domestic contract safeties in lieu of transnational policies of 
comity, reciprocity, and party autonomy encourages this system by where a party can 
agree to arbitrate in Belgium, or in Japan, have a procedurally weak arbitration where 
their rights are lessened, have the award be given to their opponent, have that award 
enforced against them without judicial review because of international policies that 
were meant to promote and induce trade and international business like what they 
partook in.  This is a never ending, vicious cycle.  The policy of the nations will harm 
its citizens, which in effect harms the economic interests of that nation when their 
national loses.  However, the policy stays intact, due in large part to the globalized 
world, and the interest of international comity and reciprocity.   While West Germany 
(infra footnote) and Belgium (infra footnote) have lost some present relevance, their 
lessons should not be lost.  A cautionary tale is the lesson learned by unfortunate 
defendants who were subject to enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.  All nations 
have not changed their code, as Belgium has, and good business practice would 
seem to include exploring the law of countries where corporations have assets, to 
guard against foreign law enforcing ill-gotten judgments. 
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Policy alternatives 
 
 There is no doubt that the present, cyclic system is problematic to parties with 
less bargaining power, and parties in general, as the award will likely be enforced 
against them without domestic review in countries where they have assets that are 
seizable.  The question remains then, as to whether there is a better system to 
replace the current one, or if this is the best system possible. 
 The realm of possible alternatives includes an isolationist policy, where there 
was a transnational policy; restricted comity and expectations of reciprocity, where 
there was nearly unfettered comity and reciprocity.  In this section, a policy 
alternative will be examined for its benefits and drawbacks, using policy 
methodology.275 
 Examining the problem from the perspective that American businesses are 
losing assets that are being seized by opposing parties in foreign countries without 
review of arbitral awards to ensure substantive and procedural fairness, the problem 
is easily defined.  The next step is to assemble evidence.  As the Belgian code 
judiciaire flatly states, mechanisms are in place for the peril of no review to occur in 
countries foreign to the United States.  This peril is more than proposed or 
threatened.  As the case law, discussed earlier, indicates, American domiciliaries are 
threatened by foreign policies like the Belgians have statutorily enacted. 
What is the alternative to this transnational policy that the Supreme Court has 
adopted and used over the past five decades?  The simple answer is an isolationist 
policy.  That is to refuse to enforce awards based on comity and actively give them a 
second look.  This includes not playing the game of reciprocity with foreign nations, 
but to act independently of them and to review the merits of the award with force and 
vigor. 
The tradeoffs of this policy are numerous and frightening.  With the world being 
so globalized, a major superpower like the United States to back off support of the 
international community would devastate confidence in transnational business.  The 
effects of this chill in international business would be felt by sellers and buyers 
domestically, and abroad, and would certainly range across borders.  With less 
                                                 
275 The alternative policy will be examined using the Eightfold path, written on by Eugene Bardach.  
See Bardach, Eugene, A Practical Guide to Policy Analysis:  The Eightfold Path to More Effective 
Problem Solving (2000). 
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confidence in the international market, there would be less business done, and the 
market would shift from international to domestic, allowing buyers and sellers the 
certainty of their home law.  This lack in international business would cripple the 
international economy and pull apart international community interests.  This lack of 
trust in the international market would be wholly destructive to the global market 
economy. 
Faced with such a destructive outcome, the clear choice is clear.  Winston 
Churchill once stated “It has been said that democracy is the worst form of 
government except all the others that have been tried.”276  While there are flaws with 
the present system that expose American domiciliaries to danger, the benefits 
enjoyed by all would be wholly destroyed should an isolationist policy that protects 
those same domiciliaries be enacted. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 International commercial arbitration is more than a reality in modern society; it 
is a necessity.  With the billions upon billions of commerce and trade done daily, 
arbitration must exist to ensure order in a chaotic business community with few hard 
and fast legal rules and almost no uniformity. 
 Beginning with the FAA, domestically, and the New York Convention, globally, 
the United States has been moving to a society which accepts and promotes 
arbitration as a remedy to the already backlogged judicial system.  Support for this 
practice has been evidenced domestically by decisional case law such as The 
Bremen and Mitsubishi, and internationally by examples such as the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration.   
 While there are tradeoffs with the present system under the New York 
Convention and such national laws as the Belgian code judiciaire, those downsides 
dwarf the potential for chaos and disorder that would be caused by the United States 
Supreme Court not being such an adamant proponent of international arbitration. 
 
                                                 
276Attributed to Sir Winston Churchill, British politician, (1874-1965), available at 
http://www.quotegarden.com/government.html. 
